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Abstract 
 
This article examines how the discourse of nation functions as a mechanism furthering the 
expansion of a neoliberal market civilization in Russia. It contributes to discussions that 
have challenged the assumed mutual exclusivity of economic nationalism and 
neoliberalism. The article develops its argument in the context of the idea of contemporary 
international society as a market civilization characterised by an adaptation to and 
adoption of neoliberal standards by states. The ongoing modernisation project in Russia 
illustrates the workings of such standards, as exemplified by the project for an innovation 
city in Skolkovo, in the Moscow metropolitan area. Building on an analysis of the Skolkovo 
debate, the article agues that there is no inherent contradiction between economic 
nationalism and neoliberalism. Rather, the nation is an important symbolic system that 
produces a cultural susceptibility to and a discursive field for the introduction of neoliberal 
standards of market civilization in Russia. 
 
Introduction 
 
This article argues that economic nationalism and neoliberalism do not form a 
contradiction, but are productively intertwined in contemporary Russian political thought 
and practice. By scrutinising how the discourse of nation functions within a flagship project 
of Russia’s modernisation – the plan to construct a techno-citadel in the Moscow suburb of 
Skolkovo – the article challenges the idea that economic nationalism is an anachronistic 
phenomenon in an era commonly characterised as that of globalising markets and 
declining nation-states (see also Pickel 2005: 1). It argues that nationalism remains an 
important part of the (proverbial) era of globalisation – not only in the sense of 
‘governments … using economic policy to serve national goals’ (Goff 2005: 183) but also 
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in the sense of the discourse of nation actually assisting the expansion of the market 
civilisation. It is this latter aspect that this article is interested in. It takes as its starting point 
the presupposition that ‘nationalism is not only compatible with liberal capitalism; it can 
serve as an agent in its expansion, most especially in opening societies and sectors 
previously isolated from global market forces’ (True 2005: 204). The discourse of nation 
continues to provide an important mechanism for producing a cultural and historical 
susceptibility to neoliberal standards in Russia.  
 
This article is structured as follows: the first section discusses the ‘new research agenda of 
economic nationalism’ which has criticised the widespread juxtaposition of economic 
nationalism and neoliberalism. The focus then turns to the debate on market civilisations 
as the overarching form of contemporary international society, characterised by the rise of 
the market as the primary institution and a neoliberal ethos that would permit no barrier to 
market forces. The third section moves on to analyse the Russian debate on the 
construction of an innovation city in Moscow’s Skolkovo suburb. This case is an illustration 
of the Russian drive to make the country measure up to the standards of market 
civilisation and of the ways in which the discourse of nation is taken up in this context.  
 
Approaches to economic nationalism 
 
Economic nationalism and neoliberal globalisation are conventionally discussed as 
juxtaposed dynamics. This follows from the way in which economic nationalism is 
traditionally identified with policies such as mercantilism, protectionism, tariffs, quotas and 
trade barriers (e.g. Gilpin 1987), or seen as an approach which competes with 
neoliberalism not only normatively but also ontologically (e.g. O’Brien and Williams 2004). 
As a result, economic nationalism is viewed as an anachronistic economic doctrine in an 
 4 
age of intensifying transnational practices, world-wide dispersion of production powers and 
downsizing of the economic functions of the state. In a similar tone, discussions on 
economic nationalism in Russia commonly focus on issues such as restrictions to foreign 
participation within ‘strategic sectors’, the creation of ‘national champions’ or the activities 
of the ‘Kremlin-supported oligarchs’ (e.g. Goldman 2008: 98–99; Liuhto 2008).  
 
Scholars pursuing the ‘new research agenda on economic nationalism’ have challenged 
the juxtaposition of economic nationalism and (neo)liberalism. This has involved 
sharpening and widening the concept of economic nationalism: the ‘nationalist content’ of 
economic nationalism has been resuscitated (Helleiner 2002) and the fact that ‘nationalism 
as a generic phenomenon is … compatible with a variety of ideological content’ has been 
emphasised (Pickel 2005: 8; see also Crane 1998; Crane 1999). It has been pointed out 
that in many cases the discourse of nation has in fact played an important role in attempts 
to gain support for economic liberalism (e.g. Hall 2005; Müller 2005). Scholars have 
emphasised the fact hat economic nationalism as an analytical concept should be 
dissociated from specific economic policies (e.g. Goff 2005: 185).  
 
The new research agenda examines economic nationalism as the economic facet of 
national identity (Crane 1999: 215) or places some other ‘nationalising mechanism’ at the 
centre of analyses: ‘The emergence of a global financial system, for example, can and 
should be conceptualised as the result of particular nationalising policies of individual 
states – that is, the attempt to reposition ‘their’ economies in the global system’ (Pickel 
2003: 124, n. 16). It is presupposed that nationalism in one way or another causes, 
influences or shapes policies the ensemble of which is then defined as ‘economic 
nationalism’ (Helleiner 2002: 326). Economic nationalism, in the words of Rawi Abdelal, 
refers to ‘a set of policies that result from a shared national identity, or from the 
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predominance of a specific nationalism in the politics of a state’ (Rawi Abdelal cit. Helleiner 
2002: 310). This has commonly involved subsuming economic nationalism under the 
‘nationalising mechanism’ (Pickel 2003: 118) or working on the basis of ‘nationalist 
ontology’ (Helleiner 2002). In terms of a research design, this means first identifying 
nationalists and then moving on to examine their policy preferences in the realm of 
international economic integration (Shulman 2000: 368). Nationalists are defined as those 
people who pursue nationalist goals such as ‘the unity, identity, and autonomy of a nation 
or potential nation’ and demonstrate ‘great pride in the culture, territory, history, and 
destiny of a nation’ (Shulman 2000: 368). These goals, the argument goes, may 
sometimes be best served by liberal or neoliberal policies. 
 
I share the new research agenda’s concern to revisit the relationship between economic 
nationalism and neoliberalism but instead of working on the basis of any nationalist 
ontology, I hypothesise that the discourse of nation may in fact significantly contribute 
toward the expansion of the market civilisation which is framed by the discourse of 
globalising neoliberalism (Gill 1995: 399). In many ways, such a possibility is actually 
embedded in the argumentation of the above-mentioned scholars: ‘[n]ationalists are not 
uniformly against close international ties [which] raises the intriguing possibility that 
economic integration and globalisation have proceeded so swiftly not despite nationalism, 
but in part because of it’ (Shulman 2000: 368; see also Helleiner 2002: 326).  
 
This article thus emphasises the role of the discourse of nation in the expansion of the 
neoliberal market civilisation. It argues that the nation remains a powerful repertoire of 
meanings that is, among other things, drawn upon to construct interpretations of policies 
that resonate with the neoliberal political rationality. On the empirical level, the focus of the 
article is not on the economic policies of ‘nationalists’ or ‘neoliberals’. Thus, I am not 
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arguing that the mobilisation of the discourse of nation is purely instrumental or politically 
expedient. Rather, the article scrutinises the ways in which the discourse of nation 
interacts and plays together with the global standards of market civilisation in the Russian 
context. The approach taken resonates with ideas that have been put forward in recent 
scholarly literature on nationalism; these studies have argued that the nation is a symbolic 
system that can be actualised through political action in different ways depending on the 
specific historical context (e.g. Brubaker & Cooper 2000; Calhoun 1997; Verdery 1996). In 
a similar vein, this article suggests that the discourse of nation is strategically mobile. This 
renders it genuinely compatible with different governmental logics, including the neoliberal 
logic of the expanding market civilisation.  
 
Neoliberal market civilisation 
 
After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russia has explicitly adopted the objective of 
moving towards a market economy. This article turns to the notion of market civilisation to 
conceptualise such movement. The academic discussion on market civilisations has been 
inspired by debates on the historical expansion of international society (for a slightly 
different approach, see Gill 1995). The notion of international society is used to refer to a 
situation where there are some fundamental commonalities – shared interests and values, 
commonly binding rules and common institutions – among states. International society is 
qualitatively different from an international system where ‘two or more states have … 
sufficient impact on one another’s decisions … to make the behaviour of each a necessary 
element in the calculations of the other’ (Bull 1995).  
 
In the context of international societies, the standard of civilisation has historically 
functioned as ‘an expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish 
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those that belong to a particular society from those that do not’ (Gong 1998). I suggest that 
the standard of civilisation can be conceptualised as a form of productive power, a 
dominant discursive structure which ensures conformity by providing a set of norms 
against which agents evaluate and discipline not only others but also themselves (cf. 
Manokha 2009). By 1905, at the latest, a specific standard of civilisation had emerged as a 
central tenet of international law. It codified the criteria used to distinguish between 
‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ peoples and to determine membership in the ‘family of nations’ 
(Gong 1998). This 19th century standard of civilisation was primarily a legal mechanism 
that established the boundaries of the privileged group able to enjoy the advantages of 
international law: full sovereignty, full recognition, and protection under international law 
(Best 2006: 135; Bowden and Seabrooke 2006: 6).  
 
Discussions on contemporary international society as a market civilisation suggest that 
after the legal standard of civilisation was abandoned at the close of the Second World 
War, states have been increasingly judged – and have been judging themselves – against 
the benchmarks set by the discourse of globalising neoliberalism (Gill 1995: 399). This 
discourse centres on market liberalism and the imperatives of capital accumulation, i.e. 
global dispersion of productive processes, the expansion of financial capital and state 
transformation in terms of economisation, privatisation and downsizing of the state’s key 
economic functions. As a form of productive power it is geared at improving conditions for 
economic interaction on the global scale (Bowden 2006: 30). 
 
The rise in importance of the primary institution of the market is also exemplified by the 
emergence of a new set of benchmarks that Gong designates as the ‘standard of financial 
modernity’ (Gong 1998). Instead of seeking affirmation of their sovereignty from other 
states, states now seek recognition primarily as full members of the modern financial and 
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trading system (e.g. Putin 2012). A concrete manifestation of the workings of 
contemporary, market-oriented global standards is seen in more or less explicit hierarchies 
of different peoples and states; if the 19th century standard of civilisation drew distinctions 
between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ states, contemporary standards distinguish between 
‘developed economies’, ‘emerging economies’, and ‘non-market economies’ (Bowden 
2006: 31; Gong 1998).  
 
Thus, instead of working on the basis of a nationalist ontology, my analysis is based on the 
idea that contemporary international society is a neoliberal market civilisation and that 
states seeking to be recognised as its full members are being judged against a set of 
neoliberal standards. Arguably, the contemporary Russian modernisation project may be 
examined as an illustration of the significance of such standards. To briefly illustrate, 
former president Dmitri Medvedev argued that the modernisation of Russia is necessitated 
by the fact that the country is not fully ‘comparable to other rapidly developing nations’ 
(Medvedev 2010). The Skolkovo innograd is also represented as a step to this direction; in 
the occasion of initiating the project, Medvedev argued that improving the standing of 
Russia among global powers requires the building of a ’world-class research and 
development centre comparable to the American Silicon Valley’ (Medvedev 2009). 
However, it would be erroneous to interpret such practices as a simple outcome of the 
increasing power of neoliberal standards. It makes more sense to examine the Russian 
modernisation project as a field of tensions that escapes easy classifications. My argument 
is that the discourse of nation provides a set of historically rooted ideas that can be 
actualised to draw meaningful interpretations – supportive as well as critical  – of a project 
that can be seen as embedded in the contemporary market civilisation. 
 
The Skolkovo innograd and market civilisation 
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The on-going construction of the Skolkovo innovation city provides a fruitful opportunity to 
examine how the discourse of nation interacts and plays together with the global standards 
of market civilisation. At issue in the Skolkovo project initiated in 2009 is the construction 
of a ‘Russian Silicon Valley’ expected to diversify the country’s economy away from oil and 
gas. Skolkovo is envisaged to provide the infrastructure and favourable economic 
conditions for companies working within the five priority sectors of biomedical 
technologies, energy efficiency, information and computer technology, space technology, 
and nuclear technology. The Federal Law on Skolkovo Innovation Center was adopted in 
2010; the first buildings will be built in 2012 and, according to the plan, the centre’s main 
facilities will be completed by 2015. The completed innograd is expected to span roughly 
400 hectares and offer work for 30 thousand people. A special Fund for the Development 
of the Centre for Elaboration and Commercialisation of New Technologies (i.e. Skolkovo 
Foundation) has been set up to manage the project and oversee the construction of the 
town. The Foundation is headed by the businessman Viktor Vekselberg, but it functions in 
close cooperation with the Russian government. The volume of state budget funding for 
the innovation centre between 2010 and 2015 is approximately 85 billion Russian rubles 
(2,3 billion euros) (e.g. Minfin 2011). 
 
This article conceptualises the Skolkovo project as an example of the way in which the 
standards of market civilisation are taken into use in Russia. There is much to the project 
to suggest that it forms part of the process whereby the discourse of globalising 
neoliberalism – ‘an ethos that would permit no barrier to market forces’ (Ong 2003: 153) – 
spreads across the world. Firstly, it is underpinned by a script whereby the ‘world 
economy’ is being transformed into a ‘global economy’ dominated by transnational 
economic actors. Secondly, the debate on Skolkovo revolves around the standard of 
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market civilisation as polemicists represent the innograd as a means to increase Russia’s 
attractiveness in the eyes of globally ‘footloose’ capital, companies, and talent. Thirdly, 
human individuals are conceptualised first and foremost in terms of homo oeconomicus, a 
figure evaluated on the basis of his or her ability to invert human capital into income 
stream.  
 
The argument of this article is that although the debate on Skolkovo clearly resonates with 
the neoliberal standards of market civilisation, it would be erroneous to overlook the 
elements of economic nationalism within it. It is worth analysing how the standards of 
market civilisation and the discourse of nation are productively intertwined in the 
discussion over the project. Instead of evaluating whether Skolkovo actually enables 
Russia to measure up to the standards of market civilisation, the focus of this article is on 
the arguments that such ambitions animate and on the kinds of policies that are 
subsequently adopted. The research materials have been collected from the websites of 
relevant governmental authorities and the Integrum database complemented by the 
author’s daily perusal of the Russian press. The materials used thus include statements on 
Skolkovo by supporters and critics alike. Skolkovo is a state project but those speaking in 
favour of it include not just top officials but also a number of key leaders in business and 
science. Criticism is heard from representatives of the domestic opposition as well as non-
partisan commentators on domestic affairs.  
 
Analysis: the discourse of nation and the Skolkovo debate 
 
This section first discusses how the innograd project makes sense in the context of the 
neoliberal market civilisation that comprises contemporary international society. It then 
moves on to illustrate four ways in which the discourse of nation is mobilised both by 
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supporters and critics alike to argue meaningful interpretations of the project. The 
discourse of nation nationalises the project by placing it within the context of a national 
social purpose. It naturalises the project by suggesting that engagement with the types of 
activities that rank high in the standards of market civilisation is only natural for Russia and 
Russians. It idealises the project by linking it to a compelling view of the future and 
investing it with emotions of national pride and importance. All these framings serve to 
depoliticise the project, to place it outside of present day political debates as well as to 
encourage the logic of neoliberal competition within other sectors while protecting the 
political status quo. (Cf. Fougner 2006.)   
 
Neoliberal Skolkovo 
 
An indicator of the standards of market civilisation motivating the contemporary Russian 
modernisation project and Skolkovo as a part of it is its spatial imaginary. Instead of 
enforcing the idea of the territorial integrity of the Russian nation, the polemicists often rely 
on the spatial imaginary of the ‘nodal landscape’ which is inspired by the neoliberal 
paradigm (e.g. Desrosières 2003: 563). The Skolkovo project does not turn on the familiar 
Westphalian image of the global political space divided into sovereign nation-states. 
Instead, it is underpinned by the idea of a ‘common technological and innovative space’ 
(Medvedev 2011) which resonates with neoliberal visions of an emerging borderless world 
(e.g. Ohmae 1996). A small number of places on a sub-national scale that are (or have the 
potential to become) key nodes in the networks of world economy are emphasised. 
Skolkovo’s spatial imaginary thus signals a departure from the familiar structure of the 
nationally-scaled image of Russian/Soviet space hierarchically organised around a 
dominant centre (Moscow) with radiant lines of influence extending over the rest of the 
state territory (French 1984: 362). Neither does it resonate with the imperial vision and its 
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‘massive aesthetic of whole continents and peoples and Russia’s power and influence 
within that global scenario’ (Clowes 2011: 49). Rather, the innograd is envisaged as a key 
node in a global network of significant places. 
 
This conceptualisation is tied to a specific understanding of the character of contemporary 
global politics. Flexible accumulation and the connected idea of spatial deconcentration 
are assumed to go hand-in-hand with a reconcentration of finance and management in 
certain hotspots. Nation-states are thus replaced as the key organising spatial nodes of a 
new global economic system’ and the hot-spots ‘bypassing’ their nation-states are 
assumed to form separate supranational networks among themselves (Golubchikov 2010: 
626). 
 
The nodal spatial imaginary gains backing from an assumption of the mobility of a specific 
group of people: professional cosmopolitan migrants who the market civilisation privileges 
(Ong 2003:154). Skolkovo is designed namely for such an elite. Its city manager argues 
that for great many Skolkovo residents the proximity and ease of access to the 
international airport will be of much more importance than local automotive or train 
connections (Viktor Maslakov cit. Kommersant 2011). As an outright renunciation of the 
national discourse, Skolkovo is thus advertised as a non-Russian location, a place where 
the global elite can feel at home. Echoing Gerrit Gong’s notion of ‘cosmopolitan culture’ as 
the emerging global standard of civilisation (Gong 1984: 92), the character of the innograd 
as a ‘multi-cultural city’ is highlighted; ‘we want the culture of every country to be 
represented here’ (Viktor Maslakov cit. RIA Novosti 2011). Although Russia is a multi-
ethnic state, here ethnicity obviously figures differently, as an element of the cosmopolitan 
discourse (cf. Ong 2003: 154).  
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Aihwa Ong has scrutinised the ways in which the neoliberal script of globalisation has 
given rise to ‘new spaces’ in South East Asia, spaces defined by different rationalities than 
the rest of the state territory (Ong 2004). Quite similarly, the Skolkovo plan relies on a 
number of procedures, instruments and tactics that enforce the logic of neoliberal 
exceptions over Russia’s state space. At issue here is the ‘insertion of optimising 
calculations or tactics in some domains but not in others’ (Ong 2008: 121) – or over parts 
of the population but not over others. Skolkovo is a unique domain within Russia’s state 
space and its uniqueness is a result of a cascade of interventions that either privilege or 
disadvantage specific groups of people depending on their capacity to engage global 
market interests. In this sense, the Skolkovo project might be argued to follow the logic of 
the global standard of market civilisation and its neoliberal ethos rather than the logic of 
the discourse of nation. 
 
The exceptional character of the Skolkovo innograd as a ‘geographically separate 
complex’ is explicitly affirmed in the law (Federal Law 2010). The law exempts participants 
to the Skolkovo project from various legal norms and regulations in the fields of customs, 
taxation, immigration and administration (Federal Law 2010; Federal Law 2011). These 
are concrete examples of the workings of a standard of civilisation geared at creating 
optimal conditions for economic interaction. The rhetoric of Skolkovo further detaches it 
from the rest of the national territory by invoking such standards of financial modernity as 
absence of corruption, protection of investor rights and property as well as transparent 
judicial and administrative processes. The innograd is thus represented as immune to 
problems that are commonly perceived to hamper foreign investment inflows to Russia 
(Vedomosti 2010b).  
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Another illustration of the downplaying of the scale of the nation is the fact that the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are not dependent on one’s citizenship. Rather, they 
follow from an individual’s value as determined by global market standards. Skolkovo is 
exclusionary with regard to Russian citizens and foreigners who are not capable of 
engaging global market interests and inclusionary with regard to those Russians and 
foreigners who are. In the logic of Skolkovo, people figure as ‘differentially capitalised 
citizen-subjects’ (Ong 2003: 163). A set of procedures which makes the entry into the 
Russian Federation significantly easier for qualified foreign specialists who work in 
Skolkovo has been introduced to the law (Federal Law 2011; see also Interfax 2010). 
Another example of the logic that empowers market forces vis-à-vis the original population 
is an interview with the city manager of the innograd; it reveals a worry that the 
surrounding population whose social and cultural background differs from the inhabitants 
of Skolkovo might ‘flood’ into the innograd to benefit from its services. Curiously, however, 
the decision not to prevent the original population from entering Skolkovo hinges on the 
neoliberal logic of innovations requiring openness (Viktor Maslakov cit. Kommersant 
2011).  
 
The new legislation also regulates the right to gain residence in Skolkovo. All property is 
owned by the management company and project participants will be able to rent it and 
provide housing for their employees (Federal Law 2010). Renting out is expected to 
promote the mobility and flexibility which is central to the constitution of flexible 
transnational economies; once tasks have been accomplished, people are welcome to 
leave. The city manager of Skolkovo envisages the place as a ‘town of temporary 
population’ and uses the Soviet experience as a negative example: the city will not repeat 
the mistake of the closed cities of science that became permanent places of residence for 
ageing and ‘inert’ scientists (Kommersant 2011). The entitlement to reside in a certain 
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territory is here used as an instrument with the help of which capital and commercial flows 
are facilitated (Rose 1999: 481). 
 
Nationalisation 
 
Although the Skolkovo project is in many ways premised on a set of neoliberal ideas that 
envisage an unlimited global market and a borderless world (e.g. Medvedev 2011), the 
mobilisation of the discourse of nation in debates on the innograd simultaneously serves to 
reproduce the image of Russia as a nation and a sovereign state.  
 
The construction of the Skolkovo innograd is motivated by the idea of Russia lagging 
behind in international competitiveness (e.g. Skolkovo Foundation 2010). International 
competitiveness is one of the benchmarks imposed by contemporary market civilisation, 
but it also has curious potential to turn issues into questions of national importance. Firstly, 
envisaging Russia as one among several nations engaged in economic competition 
reproduces the image of the world that consists of nations and their relations (cf. Fougner 
2006: 183). Secondly, international competitiveness often comes to mean inter-
jurisdictional competition and the desire to ‘lock in’ the benefits of free market policies may 
actually motivate regulatory sovereignty in the context of international capital mobility 
(Harmes 2012).  
 
Within the Skolkovo debate the notion of international competitiveness is actualised in a 
form which reproduces the myth of the nation’s citizenry sharing a common economic fate. 
In fact, the argumentation of supporters and critics alike revolves around this myth. While 
supporters mobilise it to suggest that the well-being of each and all depends on the 
achievement of the benchmarks that the Skolkovo plans set, critics point out that the 
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suggested policies are likely to have an uneven impact on Russians across gender, class 
and location. They argue that the chosen policy disadvantages Russians at the expense of 
foreigners or simply benefits those Russians who are already well-off.  
 
Critics of the project thus activate the idea of the primacy of the nation as they characterise 
Skolkovo as a zone into which certain foreigners – individuals and businesses – are being 
attracted but from which Russian citizens or institutions are not able to benefit. In a 
caricature published in the Vedomosti newspaper, the head of the Skolkovo project Viktor 
Vekselberg is depicted guarding the gates of the innograd from the representatives of the 
Federal Taxation Service as if he was St. Peter at the gates of heaven (Vedomosti 2010a). 
This constitutes an argument that instead of the Russian state and nation benefitting from 
the project, its tax incentives provide paradise-like conditions for foreigners to enjoy.  
 
 
 
Similarly, the idea of a globally available workforce has been taken up to argue that the 
innograd is an arrangement which enables Western multinationals to exploit the Russian 
talent pool. Foreign corporations are argued to be interested in participating in the project 
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mainly for the reason that the wages of Russian experts are lower than in many countries 
with an equally skilled labour force (e.g. Novaia Gazeta 2010). However, responding to 
such accusations, the representatives of the project also revert to the nationalising 
capacity of the discourse of nation. This is done with the help of what Billig (1995) has 
called the ‘deixis of homeland’, i.e. little words that invoke the national ‘we’ and imply that 
the discussed project relates to ‘us’ and address the audience as a nation (Billig 1995: 11, 
108): ‘it is particularly important that our foreign partners understand that they do not come 
to Skolkovo for huge profits or … to take advantage of Russian talents. But [… in order to] 
to develop science, technology and innovations of our country together with us’ (Alferov 
2011). Such use of the deixis of homeland forms part of an attempt to persuade the 
audience that their interests are ‘identical’ with one another, and at the same time different 
from those of ‘our foreign partners’ (cf. Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 4–5; see also Richter 
1996: 70). In a similar tone, the recruitment of foreign experts is characterised as a ‘pure 
necessity ... for Russia’s modernisation to succeed’ (Representative of Ministry of 
Economy cit. Vedomosti 2010d) or, alternatively, the ‘patriotic’ character of attempts to 
attract foreigners to work in Skolkovo is emphasised (Vladislav Surkov cit. Vesti24 2010b).  
 
Large sums of public money are being invested in Skolkovo. But the innograd has been 
accused of being an oligarchic project and a smoke screen that the elite – ‘politicians and 
closely affiliated oligarchs’ – uses for private profit-making (Bazhanov 2010; Gennadii 
Ziuganov cit. Kommersant FM 2011; Nemtsov & Milov 2010: 43; Novaia Gazeta 2010). 
The fact that the price of land is among the highest in the country is argued to raise doubts 
about the ability of ordinary engineers and small businesses to benefit from the Skolkovo 
project (Nemtsov & Milov 2010: 43). From the perspective of the interplay of neoliberal 
standards and the discourse of nation it is quite interesting to note that the notion of 
oligarchy calls to mind the idea of a privileged group, and criticism of Skolkovo as an 
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oligarchic project thus reverberates with the neoliberal demand for genuine competition. 
Here, the idea of Skolkovo as a violation of the norms of genuine competition is argued to 
render it incompatible with the interests of the Russian nation. The observation here is not 
simply that Skolkovo critics mobilise the discourse of nation against a neoliberal project but 
that these discursive structures intersect in the argumentation of both critics and 
supporters. 
 
Idealisation 
 
The way in which the discourse of nation is mobilised in debates over the Skolkovo 
innograd also serves to constitute specific types of business activities – those that 
reverberate with the main ideas of neoliberal market civilisation – as desirable and 
commendable, that is, to idealise them (see also Fougner 2006). 
 
Skolkovo forms part of the contemporary project to modernise Russia in terms of 
expanding the high technology sectors in the country’s economy. The project is 
underpinned by a somewhat pessimistic picture of the present state of the country’s 
economy which is heavily dependent on raw materials’ exports. This perpetuates the 
familiar image of Russia as a nation continuously catching-up with the ‘West’ (e.g. 
Gerschenkron 1962). Against this background, the ‘theory’ of (Porterian) clusters is taken 
up to offer a compelling view of the future. It is intertwined with the discourse of nation in 
suggestions that Russia has real potential to ‘catch and overtake’ other countries if it 
invests in selected clusters: information technology, biomedicine, energy efficiency, space, 
and nuclear technology (Skolkovo Foundation 2011a; see also Rossiiskaia Gazeta 2012).  
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Although the discourse of nation plays an important role in interpretations of Skolkovo as a 
step toward a brighter economic future, the spatial logic of clusters is not nationally-scaled. 
It rather resonates with the above-discussed nodal imaginary of the global landscape (e.g. 
Porter 2008:  199). The assumption is that clustering on subnational scale enables local 
industry to become significant on the global scale, i.e. to ‘compete globally’ (Sum 2008: 
143). Porterian cluster thinking is typically liberal (e.g. Fougner 2006) or neoliberal (e.g. 
Moisio 2008; Sum 2008). First, it invites governments to think of themselves as business 
environments, which illustrates the rise in importance of the primary institution of the 
market and the related expansion of business logic to sectors that previously have been 
relatively immune to its dictates. Second, it is strongly informed by the globalist conception 
of world economy; the scale of the nation is relatively irrelevant in efforts to foster ‘truly 
global industries’, i.e. such business endeavours that can succeed in global competition 
(Fougner 2006: 198). Third, the approach is motivated by the neoliberal impulse to 
economise on the use of resources and effort as illustrated by a pro-Skolkovo argument 
according to which ‘for research activity to be efficient ... people must be together. Not 
three in Tomsk, three in Novosibirsk and four in Moscow’ (Vladislav Surkov cit. Izvestiia 
2010).  
 
Such thinking clearly challenges the traditional view of Russia’s vast territorial size and 
(relatively) even development across its territory as a guarantee of the country’s high rank 
in the hierarchy of states. However, the discourse of nation plays an important role in 
efforts to come up with meaningful interpretations of this ‘glocalising’ process which, 
instead of being geared at equalising the distribution of population, industry and 
infrastructure across the national territory, is aimed at concentrating the capacities for 
economic development within clusters located at strategic subnational sites (cf. Brenner 
2003). Here, the discourse of the nation invests the suggested policies with emotions of 
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pride and anxieties which are linked to questions of Russia catching-up as well as fears 
about its sheer survival (cf. Sum 2008: 139). Skolkovo is promoted as a means that 
enables people to change their perception of Russia, to stop approaching it as an ‘oil 
barrel’ or ? ‘lump of firewood’ and national prestige is interpreted in terms of ability to 
produce the most advanced technology (Vladislav Surkov cit. Vesti24 2010a). Arguably, 
this links issues of prestige to the idea of ‘knowledge as capital’ and, through it, to the 
neoliberal paradigm of market civilisation (e.g. Olssen & Peters 2005: 330).  
 
One outcome of the coarticulation of the discourses of nation and neoliberal market 
civilisation is that questions of image and reputation are thought of as an essential part of 
the nation-state’s competitive advantage: ‘countries represent themselves to global 
consumers and investors, acting like contestants [in] a beauty contest’ (True 2005: 205). 
Often the proverbial beauty of states is measured by different neoliberally-structured 
ratings, such as corruption or competitiveness indices. Countries are first hierarchised in 
terms of their ability to appeal to globally footloose capital and differently-ranked countries 
are then invited to adopt certain market-friendly steps to increase their appeal and improve 
their position in the hierarchy. This is also an important element in the promotion of 
Skolkovo to foreign audiences (e.g. Russia Today 2010). The fact that such transnational 
mechanisms of surveillance and visibility figure as authoritative sources in discussions 
over the Russian innograd may be taken as one concrete example of the power of the 
standards of market civilisation over Russian authorities and – through their governmental 
interventions – over wider populations (cf. Fougner 2008: 318; Sum 2008). Importantly, 
however, the fact that Russia’s position in various rankings is interpreted as a matter of 
national prestige provides one illustration of a productive relationship between the 
discourse of nation and the neoliberal market civilisation. 
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Naturalisation 
 
By ‘naturalisation’ I refer to the capacity of the discourse of nation to constitute the types of 
business activities that form part of the Skolkovo project as natural for Russia and 
Russians to invest and engage in (cf. Fougner 2006: 190). Although Skolkovo is a part of 
the Russian government’s economic modernisation program, a set of non-economic 
meanings ascribed to the innograd serve to place the project within a wider frame than 
economy. In the context of the presentation of the nuclear cluster, for example, the Soviet 
atomic project is called to mind to imply that the decades-long experience with nuclear 
technology, beginning with the establishment of a nuclear laboratory at the Academy of 
Sciences in 1921, has placed the country in a ‘unique position of global technological 
leadership’ (Skolkovo Foundation 2011b). In the spirit of ‘country branding’, the polemicists 
rely on the discourse of nation as they emphasise and reinforce the distinctiveness of 
Russia and play up the uniqueness of the local population (see also True 2005: 202). 
Russia’s reputation as the successor state of the first country to put a man in space and 
develop nuclear weapons as well as the home to many world-class physicists and 
engineers is frequently stressed (e.g. Skolkovo Foundation 2012: 3). 
 
It is noteworthy that Russia’s past is employed in the analysed materials in a form which is 
not in conflict with the standards of contemporary market civilisation. This is illustrated, for 
instance, in the discussion between supporters of the Skolkovo project and those speaking 
in favour of rather investing in the Soviet-era naukograds (cities of science) (e.g. Rosbalt 
2011; cf. Alferov 2011). This discussion resonates with an increasingly pervasive 
neoliberal urban development script which suggests that with the dawn of a new form of 
capitalism based on human creativity ‘effective people climates’ which attract and retain 
particular types of people are becoming more important than business climates as such 
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(Florida 2002; see also Peck 2005). In a similar tone, the character of the innograd as a 
‘cool’, multicultural place is said to distinguish it from the naukograds of the Soviet era.  
 
A completely new urban environment is argued to be needed in order to stimulate 
creativity in science and in business, to generate new forms of sociality and, ultimately, a 
new type of subject: a creative person blossoming with unforeseen commercial 
innovations (RIA Novosti 2011; Skolkovo Foundation 2011c). In the words of architect 
David Adjaye, the physical set-up of the Skolkovo School of Management is expected to 
encourage ‘networking, cross-pollination and dialogue’, i.e. qualities required from 
Moscow’s new managerial class (Financial Times 2010). Although such characterisations 
of the new subject in many ways resemble the neoliberal homo oeconomicus, the 
historically-rooted discourse of nation plays an important role here (see also Salmenniemi 
2012). In changing people, the architecture of the building appeals to Russian traditions as 
many of its architectural features call to mind the work of Kazimir Malevich and other 
Russian Suprematists. Curiously, the production of this artistic group was motivated by the 
idea of the past system as a defunct one. In the context of Skolkovo, the future is imagined 
with reference to the logic of expansive capitalism as illustrated by the School’s mission to 
train leaders to the BRICs and other emerging markets which offer new possibilities for 
profit-making (e.g. Moscow School of Management 2011). Such selective use of Russian 
and Soviet histories illustrates that accommodation to the standards of an expanding 
market civilisation simultaneously invites the nation-state to play up its ‘distinctive history, 
geography, and gender and ethnicity and in so doing (re)invent a sense of national identity 
in order to carve out a strategic niche and competitive advantage in the global economy’ 
(True 2005: 204).  
 
Depolitisation 
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One way in which the discourse of nation contributes to Russia’s adaptation to the 
neoliberal market civilisation is that it is actualised, on the one hand, in attempts to place 
the Skolkovo project outside of present day political debates and, on the other hand, in 
efforts to dismiss the importance of competition within the country’s political sector 
simultaneously with promoting open competition within business. 
 
The previous sections have shown that the attempts to meet the standard of contemporary 
market civilisation partly rely on the idea of the innograd as a non-Russian location. The 
separation from the rest of Russian territory takes place not only with the help of rhetoric 
but also through a number of ‘neoliberal exceptions’ which are enforced with the help of 
legislation, taxation and architecture. Such neoliberal exceptions, however, coexist with 
‘exceptions to neoliberalism’ which rule certain sectors, people, or places out from 
neoliberal calculations (Ong 2006: 4). In the case of Skolkovo, the political and business 
sectors are treated quite differently. A newspaper editorial argues that Skolkovo shows 
that the choice has been made to ‘trade nanofilters’ instead of encouraging institutional 
changes that would lead to the emergence of ‘real competition in the economy and politics’ 
(Vedomosti 2010c). In counterarguments, the discourse of nation is mobilised to dispute 
the importance of the modernisation of the country’s political system. Russia’s 
modernisation is said to follow a unique path of development due to which foreign models 
(e.g. ‘Western democracy’) cannot be simply replicated in Russia (e.g. Mau 2010: 100). 
Russia’s uniqueness grounds an argument that although self-enterprising ethos and 
entrepreneurialism are needed in business, this is not necessarily the case within the 
political sector (cf. Ong 2008: 121).  
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As Skolkovo is clearly a state project, critics quite often harness neoliberal demands to 
limit the functions of the state. ‘Neo-liberalism’, as Rose and Miler note, ‘reactivates liberal 
principles: scepticism over the capacities of political authorities to govern everything for the 
best; vigilance over the attempts of political authorities to seek to govern’ (Rose & Miller 
2010: 296). In many instances, the polemicists play on the neoliberal suspicion of the state 
not only governing too much but intervening in the sector of innovations where its 
involvement is actually harmful: state servants are not the right figures for the task of 
constructing an innovation economy and the mediocrity of bureaucrats is contrasted with 
the inventiveness of entrepreneurs (Igor’ Nikolaev cit. Finam FM 2010; Nikishenkov 2011). 
Here, the discourse of nation and the trope of its uniqueness are taken up by the 
supporters to defend the central role of the state and its head. The presidential character 
of the Skolkovo project is legitimised by arguing that in order for anything substantive to 
work in Russia, the head of state has to be involved (Dmitri Medvedev cit. Reuters 2010). 
The discourse of nation thus serves to defend the role of the state within a project whose 
ethos is in many ways neoliberal. Arguably, such a combination of elements is expected to 
enable Russia to take part in neoliberal competition for footloose capital without 
jeopardising the system of ‘sovereign democracy’ (see also Mäkinen 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
        
Arguably, one of the paradoxes of our time is that states promote denationalising and 
transnationalising policies in order to deal with national problems, in the name of their 
‘national interest’ (Beck 2005). This apparent paradox lies at the heart of this article. This 
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paper is a contribution to the recent efforts to redefine economic nationalism and to 
challenge the conventional view which associates it with illiberal or statist policies or 
characterises it as an approach competing with neoliberalism not only normatively but also 
ontologically. Building on the work of scholars representing the ‘new research agenda of 
economic nationalism’, I have sought to argue that there is no inherent contradiction 
between economic nationalism and neoliberalism. But instead of working on the basis of 
any ‘nationalist ontology’ as the representatives of this new research agenda do, I have 
attempted to develop my argument in the context of the idea of contemporary international 
society as a market civilisation where states are increasingly evaluated against – and 
where they evaluate themselves – against neoliberal standards of civilisation. I have 
argued that the discourse of nation provides an important repertoire of meanings that is 
being drawn upon to argue meaningful interpretations of policies that reverberate with the 
standards of neoliberal market civilisation.  
 
With this as my point of departure, I have argued that the contemporary modernisation 
project of the Russian state constitutes a field of tensions and that the political dynamics at 
play within it thus escape simple classifications. More specifically, I have focused on how 
the discourse of nation and neoliberal standards function hand-in-hand within domestic 
debates over a flagship project of the modernisation project, the construction of a techno-
citadel in Skolkovo in the outskirts of Moscow. This has involved highlighting how these 
discursive structures at times challenge and at other times find support from one another.  
 
In particular, I have argued that the discourse of nation helps to nationalise, naturalise, 
idealise and depoliticise a project which resonates with the neoliberal ethos of 
contemporary market civilisation which would permit no barrier to market forces. Although 
the Skolkovo project is in many ways underpinned by the neoliberal idea of a ‘borderless 
 26 
world’ rather than the modern image of the global space divided into separate nation-
states, the discourse of nation nationalises the project, that is, constitutes it as a matter of 
national importance. The discourse of nation also contributes toward depoliticising the 
Skolkovo project by attempting to place it outside of present day political debates as well 
as silencing arguments that highlight the importance of increasing open competition not 
only within business but also within the political sector. Under the discussion on 
idealisation I have illuminated how the discourse of nation invests the innograd with 
emotions of pride and anxiety and links it to the thematic of a brighter future for Russia. 
The capacity of the discourse of nation to naturalise a set of policies attuned to the dictates 
of contemporary market civilisation refers to the representation of the Skolkovo project and 
the types of activities associated with it as somehow natural for Russia and Russians to 
invest in. This involves highlighting continuity with the country’s historical past as well as 
emphasising the distinctiveness of the country and its inhabitants in a way that is expected 
to reverberate with the standards of market civilisation.  
 
The empirical case under study here thus provides support for the invitation to revisit the 
conventional usage which juxtaposes economic nationalism to liberal or neoliberal 
economic policies and sees them as mutually exclusive. Firstly, the an interplay between 
the discourse of nation and the neoliberal discourse of market civilisation can often be 
found – their relationship is productive rather antithetical. Secondly, globalising and 
nationalising processes commonly interact, which may be taken to suggest that despite its 
characteristic vision of an emerging borderless world, neoliberal globalisation actually 
requires nationalising processes to become effective.  
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